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DAV I D  LO EW
D E C E N T R A L I Z A T I O N  A S  A  M O D E L  FO R  C O N F L I C T  T R A N S F O R M A T I O N :  
TH E  C A S E  OF  K O S O V O
“Peace is a question of will. All conflicts can be settled, and there 
are no excuses for allowing them to become eternal. It is simply 
intolerable that violent conflicts defy resolution for decades 
causing immeasurable human suffering, and preventing 
economic and social development.” Martti Ahtisaari1
ABSTRACT
In post-conflict societies, decentralization is often 
used as a conflict management tool to address 
territorial claims and interests. The latest example is 
the agreement between the Republics of Serbia and 
Kosovo of April 2013 over the status of four Kosovar  
municipalities which remained under de facto control  
and jurisdiction of Serbia. Nevertheless, there is a 
lack of comprehensive research on the long-term 
effects of decentralization on ethnic conflict. To 
contribute to filling this research gap, this paper  
focuses on the impact of decentralization on the 
establishment of sustainable peace through conflict  
transformation. Based on the theory on 
decentralization in post-conflict institution-building,  
two models of decentralization are developed. While  
the first model focuses on conflict management  
through the separation of ethnic groups, ethnic self-
rule and conflict resolution on the level of political  
elites, the second model focuses on conflict  
transformation at the local level through initiating 
contact, cooperation and trust-building in local  
institutions. As a case study the paper examines the 
decentralization process in the Republic of Kosovo,  
which entails both models of decentralization. To 
investigate the hypothesis that the Kosovar  
decentralization process has already supported and 
continues supporting conflict transformation, the 
paper analyzes 16 interviews with representatives of  
international and Kosovar NGOs and think tanks,  
international organizations and governmental  
agencies working in the field of decentralization. It  
focuses on 34 municipalities in which the 
decentralization program had already been 
implemented in 2011 and thus leaving aside the 
situation in the four municipalities mentioned above.  
The paper concludes that ethnic conflict in Kosovo is 
still far from being transformed. Nevertheless,  
decentralization has contributed to the development  
of an institutional setting allowing for the 
transformation of the ethnic conflict. Where  
implemented, decentralization has promoted the 
acceptance of the Republic of Kosovo among non-
majority communities. When looking at the two 
models of decentralization, it can be noted that  
ethnically heterogeneous municipalities following the 
second model have been able to facilitate  
cooperation between representatives of ethnic  
groups while homogenous municipalities have hardly  
contributed to conflict transformation.
1 Quotation from Martti Ahtisaari’s Nobel lecture in Oslo, Norway on 10th December 2008.
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DAV I D  LO EW
DECENTRALIZATION AS A MODEL OF CONFLICT 
TRANSFORMATION: THE CASE OF KOSOVO
1. INTRODUCTION
On 19 April 2013, Hashim Thaçi,  Prime Minister of 
the  Republic  of  Kosovo,  and  Ivica  Dačić,  Prime 
Minister of the Republic of Serbia,  signed the ‘First 
Agreement  of  Principles  Governing  the 
Normalization  of  Relations’.  The  European  Union 
(EU), for which the High Representative for Foreign 
Affairs  and  Security  Policy  Baroness  Catherine 
Ashton  mediated  in  the  dialogue,  hailed  this 
agreement,  fruit  of  six  months  and  ten  rounds  of 
negotiations,  as a breakthrough to overcome ethnic 
animosities,  foster  regional  stability  and  bring 
forward the countries  EU-membership  aspirations2. 
The  agreement  consists  of  15  paragraphs  mostly 
dealing  with  measurements  of  delegating  decision-
making competencies of the de facto government of 
the  Republic  of  Kosovo  to  four  contested 
municipalities  with  a  Kosovo-Serb  majority3.  By 
signing the agreement Serbia  recognizes  Prishtina’s 
authority  over  the  whole  territory  of  Kosovo  while 
Kosovo grants certain extend of local authority to the 
Kosovo-Serbs.     
The  introduction  of  decentralization  policies  as 
instrument  for  conflict  management  is  not  new  to 
Kosovo,  it  has  been  used  in  previous  negotiations 
between Serbia and Kosovo and has been defined as 
one of the key policies for conflict management in the 
Republic of Kosovo4.  In fact,  almost all concessions 
regarding municipal autonomy that can be found in 
the agreement have already been introduced before 
as competencies of the Kosovar municipalities  with 
Kosovo-Serb majority and have been implemented in 
seven  municipalities  with  Serbian  and  Turkish 
majorities  under  the  control  of  the  Republic  of 
Kosovo since its independence. 
2 http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2013/190413__eu-
facilitated_dialogue_en.htm (19. September 1980)
3 http://www.rts.rs/upload/storyBoxFileData/2013/04/20/322431
8/Originalni%20tekst%20Predloga%20sporazuma.pdf (19. 
September 1980)
4 Gjoni et al. 2010: 306. Compare Chapter 3.2 of this Working 
Paper.
Kosovo’s  decentralized  structure  was  developed 
almost exclusively by the transitional authority of the 
United Nations, was adopted by Kosovar authorities 
in the context of the declaration of independence and 
continues  to  be  implemented  with  the  help  of 
international  organizations.  By  introducing 
decentralization,  the  international  community 
reverted to an established instrument in institution-
building.  It  seeks  to  strengthen  the  efficiency  and 
legitimacy of governments by bringing the decision-
making process closer to the people. However, in the 
particular context of the ethnic conflict in Kosovo, it 
remains  to  be  examined  if,  and  to  what  extent, 
decentralization  serves  as  an  instrument  for  the 
promotion  of  a  peaceful  co-existence  of  ethnic 
communities.
The majority of recent research on Kosovo focuses on 
the  causes  and  strategies  for  the  management  of 
violent  tensions  in  the  four  Serb-majority 
municipalities on the northern border of the country 
dealt with by the newly signed agreement. However, 
in the other municipalities under the control  of the 
Kosovar authorities, only a small number of incidents 
of  interethnic  violence  have  been  registered. 
Especially due to this circumstance, the case of these 
municipalities  contains  valuable  lessons  for  the 
inclusion  of  the  four  contested  municipalities  in 
Kosovo’s  state  structure  as  well  as  for 
decentralization  policies  in  post-conflict  settings. 
While  there  exists  a  variety  of  literature  on  the 
influence  of  decentralization  on  self-determination, 
separatism  and  regionalism,  the  influences  of 
decentralization on the relationship  between ethnic 
communities are under-researched5. To contribute to 
closing  this  research  gap,  this  paper  argues  that 
decentralization  has  supported  and  continues 
supporting the transformation of the ethnic conflict 
in the Republic of Kosovo. The paper will provide a 
brief  overview  of  existing  decentralization  theories, 
before  developing  two  opposing  models  of 
5 Recent research mostly focuses on the model of ethnic 
decentralization. See for example Heinemann-Grüder 2011 or 
the meta study conducted by Schou/Haug 2005.
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decentralization:  the  first  model  aims  to  establish 
ethnically  homogenous  municipalities  determining 
municipal  borders  based  on  the  geographic 
distribution  of  ethnic  groups.  The  second  model 
demarcates  municipalities  along  ancient  regional 
borders,  thus  establishing  heterogeneous 
municipalities in which no ethnic group comprises a 
clear  majority.  Both  models  have  been  applied  as 
part of the Kosovar decentralization policy that was 
introduced by the Kosovar parliament following the 
country’s  declaration  of  independence  in  February 
2008. Based on this theoretical model, the paper will 
assess  its  thesis  by  first  looking  into  conflict 
transformation,  which  is  aiming  at  the 
transformation  of  discourses,  perceptions,  relations 
and  interests  between  conflict  parties  in  the  long-
term,  within  the  bodies  of  the  municipalities  and 
continuously  assessing  five  indicators:  1)  the 
inclusion  of  non-majority  communities  into 
municipal  structures,  2)  the  cooperation  and 
influence of non-majority communities on decisions, 
3) the development of shared goals, 4) the salience of 
ethnicity  in decision-making and 5)  the freedom of 
action  of  representatives  in  municipal  institutions. 
Subsequently the paper will evaluate transformation 
in the communities on the local level based on four 
indicators:  1)  the  cooperation  among  ethnic 
communities  and  their  integration  into  a  shared 
society,  2)  the  salience of  ethnic  affiliation in  daily 
life,  3)  the establishment  of  cross-cutting cleavages 
and the 4) moderating function of local ethnic elites 
in  the  conflict.  The  analysis  will  continue  with  an 
evaluation of decentralization as a potential source of 
yet  a  continuing  ethnic  conflict  in  Kosovo.  Both 
models of decentralization will be taken into account 
in  the examination  of  the  legal  framework  and the 
implementation of the decentralization policy.
To investigate the research hypothesis, in this paper 
16  expert  interviews  based  on  a  semi-standardized 
outline  are  analyzed,  evaluating  variables  and 
indicators  deducted  from  the  theoretical  model  on 
decentralization  in  post-conflict  societies  developed 
beforehand. Experts interviewed were working in the 
field  of  decentralization  for  international  and 
Kosovar  NGOs  and  think  tanks,  international 
organizations  in  Kosovo  and  for  governmental 
agencies.  By  interviewing  experts  from  different 
organizations and ethnic backgrounds the study aims 
to  include  broad  varying  perspectives  on  the 
decentralization  process.  The  interviews  were 
conducted in Prishtinë/Priština6 in September 2011, 
roughly  three  and  a  half  years  after  the  examined 
decentralization  process  was  initiated.  Looking  at 
conflict  transformation  through  decentralization, 
research  and  interviews  focus  exclusively  on  the 
situation  in  the  Kosovar  municipalities  which  have 
already been established at the time of research and 
thus  do  not  address  the  situation  in  the  contested 
north  of  Kosovo  and  its  four  municipalities 
mentioned in the introduction of this paper.
The  paper  concludes  that  the  ethnic  conflict  in 
Kosovo remains far from being transformed. Ethnic 
groups are still  highly separated in their  daily lives 
and  only  very  few  initiatives  cross-cutting  ethnic 
affiliation exist  in civil  society.  Despite  this  limited 
progress  towards  conflict  transformation,  the 
decentralization  policy  has  contributed  to  the 
development of an institutional setting allowing for a 
long-term transformation of the ethnic conflict. New 
municipalities with either a majority of ethnic non-
majority  communities  or  mixed  ethnic  populations 
have  been  established  and  indicators  suggest  that 
these  entities  are  accepted  by  the  majority  of  the 
population living in the municipalities, irrespective of 
their ethnicity.  Interethnic cooperation, both within 
institutions and on an economic level have been re-
established.  Homogenous  municipalities,  on  the 
other  hand,  have  hardly  promoted  contact  and 
cooperation  between  ethnic  communities,  pointing 
towards the possible conclusion that heterogeneous 
models  of  decentralization  are  better  suited  to 
contribute to long-term conflict transformation. 
2. THEORY:  DECENTRALIZATION  AS  A  
MODEL  FOR  CONFLICT  
TRANSFOR M ATION
2.1 TRANSFOR M ATION  OF  ETHNIC  
CONFLICTS
Many examples  of  post-conflict  societies  show that 
conflict  is  not  solved by ending the use of  violence 
alone.  In  most  post-conflict  societies,  violence 
returns  and  peace  seems  to  be  just  a  short  period 
between  periods  of  violence  (Collier  et  al.  2003). 
Therefore, conflict resolution must address the root 
causes  and  dynamics  of  violent  conflict.  Given  the 
emphasis  on  the  influence  of  policy  on  the 
6 The names of cities, municipalities and important  landmarks 
will be indicated in the official languages of the Republic of 
Kosovo, Albanian and Serbian. The language of the local ethnic 
majority will be named first. 
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transformation of ethnic conflict, it is vital to outline 
the theoretical influence of decentralization on ethnic 
conflict  and  conflict  transformation,  not  without 
clarifying the defining characteristics of both.
There are two main schools of thought regarding the 
nature of ethnicity. Primordialists conceive ethnicity 
as  an  innate  characteristic  of  individuals,  while 
constructivists  regard ethnicity as membership in a 
social group which is constructed by society and has 
variable  relations,  boundaries  and  meaning  that 
change  over  time  (Fearon/Laitin  2000:  849). 
Following the constructivist approach, conflict is not 
the  result  of  ethnicity,  but  constructed  as  such  by 
society.  Rational  approaches  stress  the  strategic 
action  of  elites  to  gain  power  through  ethnic 
mobilization  as  a  major  force  behind  the 
instrumentalization  of  ethnicity  (Fearon/Laitin 
2000). Social psychological approaches, in contrast, 
often revert to Henri Tajfel and John Turner’s (1986) 
social  identity theory,  highlighting ethnic affiliation 
as  a  source  for  positive  self-perception,  which  is 
achieved  through  competition  with  other  relevant 
ethnic  groups.  In  ethnic  conflicts,  this  inter-group 
competition  is  carried  out  through  group  value 
defined by the exertion  of  power  over  other  ethnic 
groups  (Horowitz  1985:  147).  While  the  rational 
approach  emphasizes  interests,  social  psychological 
approaches perceive identity as the principal cause of 
ethnic conflict. However, both approaches can easily 
be  connected:  in  order  to  be  able  to  mobilize 
individuals  on  the  basis  of  ethnicity  for  particular 
interests,  ethnic identity has to be salient that is of 
high relevance for the individual.  At  the same time 
these particular interests can be based on ethnically 
shaped assumptions and perceptions (Ropers 1995: 
205).  Therefore, this study defines ethnic conflict as  
competition between ethnic groups for domination  
of the other driven by the association of particular  
interests  with  group value.  Interest-based conflicts 
can  often  be  solved  by  negotiations  leading  to  a 
partition of  the conflict  issues such as control  over 
resources  or  territory.  Identity,  in contrast,  is  non-
negotiable and indivisible. Through the association of 
interests  and  identity,  conflict  management  must 
transcend the balancing of interests of the involved 
conflict  parties.  In  this  context,  the  concept  of 
conflict  transformation  provides  an  approach  to 
conflict  management  that  not  only  focuses  on 
interests but also on the relations and perceptions of 
the  conflict  parties.  It  is  based  on  the  assumption 
that the salience of ethnic affiliation is a central pre-
condition  for  ethnic  conflict.  Especially  in  post-
conflict societies that went through violence justified 
by ethnic means, ethnic identity is usually the most 
relevant  social  identity  (Wimmer/Schetter  2002: 
324).  Conflict  transformation  aims  to  transform  
discourses,  perceptions,  relations  and  interests  
between conflict parties in the long-term. Aiming at 
conflict  transformation,  the  process  of  peace-
building  should  contribute  to  overcoming  the 
antagonism between the conflict parties and, through 
altered perceptions and aims of the conflict parties, 
develop  relations  that  prevent  a  return  to  violence 
(Miall 2004: 4).
Many  strategies  for  conflict  transformation  derive 
from the contact hypothesis put forward by Yehuda 
Amir  (1969).  He  develops  four  conditions  under 
which  contact  between  individuals  of  conflicting 
ethnic  groups  might  alter  their  perception  of  other 
ethnic groups: frequent contact between the groups, 
cooperative  contact  with  overarching  aims  to  be 
pursued together, equal status of the individuals and 
institutional  support  of  the  contact  through,  for 
example,  laws,  authorities  or  norms  (Amir  1998: 
162).  On the meta-level,  the theory of cross-cutting 
cleavages  follows  a  similar  approach.  Cross-cutting 
cleavages are supposed to prevent violent conflict by 
establishing  multiple  loyalties  and  dependencies 
(Morris-Hale  1996:  1).  Even  in  deeply  divided 
societies,  cleavages  cutting  across  ethnicity  such  as 
gender issues, generational or class conflicts always 
exist but are rarely perceived as such by individuals 
(Glickmann  1995:  4).  In  order  to  establish 
sustainable peace, societies have to become aware of 
these cleavages and relate to other individuals  thus 
creating relations transcending the dominant ethnic 
cleavage. 
2.2 CONFLICT  TRANSFOR M ATION  
THROUGH  INSTITUTION- BUILDING
In  peace-building  several  approaches  have  been 
developed to strengthen the peaceful management of 
conflicts  in  post-conflict  societies.  Institution-
building, which is one of these instruments, stresses 
the  need  for  the  development  of  legitimate  and 
resilient political institutions for the institutionalized 
and non-violent management of conflicts. It seeks to 
sanction  escalating  and  promote  de-escalating 
behavior of political elites (Belmont et al 2002: 3). In 
ethnic  conflict,  institution-building  is  mostly 
comprised  of  power-sharing  between  the  elites  of 
ethnic  groups.  Two  approaches  dominate  the 
literature  on  power-sharing  arrangements:  the 
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group-building concept and the integrative concept.
The  group-building  concept  is  based  on  Arendt 
Lijphart’s  theory  of  consociational  democracy 
(Lijphart 1977), which focuses on self-determination 
and  autonomous  decision-making  of  all  ethnic 
groups  in  post-conflict  societies.  Through  far-
reaching political and cultural autonomy of all ethnic 
groups,  group-building  policies  try  to  reduce  the 
need  for  cooperation  between  ethnic  groups  to  a 
minimum.  The  remaining  political  decisions  that 
affect  all  ethnic  groups  are  taken  by  consensus 
between  the  political  elites  of  the  various  ethnic 
groups.
In  contrast,  the  integrative  concept  focuses  on 
maximizing  the  incentives  for  cooperation  between 
ethnic  groups  (Horowitz  1985).  Donald  Horowitz’s 
starting point is the assumption that there can hardly 
be  consensus  between conflict  parties  over  conflict 
issues defined in relative terms like group value and 
control of the state (Horowitz 2002: 25). Therefore, 
power-sharing institutions that follow the integrative 
approach ought to be designed to reduce the salience 
of  ethnicity  in  interethnic  relations  and  political 
decisions  by  establishing  interethnic  contact  and 
trust-building arrangements (Simonsen 2005: 298). 
Comparing  both  approaches,  group-building  rather 
focuses on conflict management while the integrative 
approach  focuses  on  long-term  conflict 
transformation.
Group-building and integrative methods both rely on 
top-down7 processes  for  the  establishment  of 
sustainable  peace,  aiming  to  moderate  the  ethnic 
claims of political elites and diminish the incentives 
to use ethnic affiliation for the pursuit of individual 
interests. It is assumed that political elites guarantee 
the peaceful behavior of their ethnic group in order 
to  pursue  their  interests.  However,  instrumental 
explanations  of  ethnic  conflict  stress  that  in  post-
conflict  societies,  political  elites  tend  to  take  only 
limited  interest  in  diminishing  the  salience  of 
ethnicity  and  instead  prefer  to  secure  their  power 
base  by maintaining  ethnic  competition  (Simonsen 
2005:  299).  Therefore,  conflict  transformation 
should  focus  on  civil  society’s  contribution  to 
sustainable  peace.  Furthermore,  ethnic  conflicts 
primarily affect the local level (Ropers 1995b: 220), 
which  is  why  some  authors  emphasize  the 
establishment of sustainable peace through bottom-
7 Top-down peace processes focus on a trickle-down effect of 
peace which first has to be established between elites through 
negotiation, balancing of interests and cooperation (Lederach 
1997: 45).
up8 processes (Lederach 1997, van Tongeren 2005). 
In this  context,  Roland Paris  identifies  civil  society 
evolving  around  cleavages  cutting  through  ethnic 
affiliation as a key to sustainable peace-building and 
conflict  transformation (Paris  2007: 278).  Coupling 
institution-building  with  a  focus  on  civil  society 
brings this approach closer to the concept of conflict 
transformation  which  seeks  to  create  sustainable 
peace  through  an  emphasis  on  civil  society  and 
bottom-up approaches. 
2.3 DECENTRALIZATION  AS  AN  
INSTRUM E NT  FOR  CONFLICT  
TRANSFOR M ATION
Both  the  group-building  and  integrative  methods 
require an identification of domains which allow for 
the implementation of self-determination on the one 
hand and trust-building and development  of  cross-
cutting  cleavages  on  the  other.  While  traditional 
instruments such as quotas or  election regimes  are 
mostly  implemented  at  the  central  level  and  favor 
top-down  approaches,  decentralization  can 
contribute  to  the  bottom-up  transformation  of 
conflicts  on  the  regional  level.  The  policy  of  
decentralization describes  the  transfer of  decision-
making  competencies  from  the  center  to  smaller  
political  entities  and  may  involve  three  different  
areas  of  competencies:  legislative  powers  in  
attributed  sectors,  financial  responsibilities  and  
administrative powers (Siegel/O’Mahony 2006: 3). 
These competencies can be transferred to three levels 
of  government:  the  federal  level,  the  regional  level 
and  the  level  of  communities.  While  the  first  two 
levels  usually  describe  the  devolution  of  decision-
making to a few powerful  sub-entities  and differ  in 
the power relations between the central government 
and  regional  entities,  the  third  level  describes  the 
devolution  of  decision-making  to  the  local  level, 
usually  not  going  beyond a  few administrative  and 
financial rights (Kälin 1997: 170).
In post-conflict societies, decentralization can be an 
instrument to include minorities in decision-making 
processes.  While  smaller  minorities  can  hardly 
influence  decision-making at  the  central  level,  they 
might constitute a majority or at least an important 
proportion  of  the  population  of  local  entities.  This 
paper examines two models of decentralization to be 
8 Bottom-up peace processes trust in cooperation and conflict 
resolution on the local level. Peace on the local level should 
spread through local elites to the political top level (Lederach 
1997: 53).
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applied  in  post-conflict  societies:  ethnic 
decentralization and territorial decentralization. The 
main difference between these two models is the way 
the  borders  of  municipalities  are  drawn,  which  is 
crucial  for  the  approach  of  conflict  resolution 
through  decentralization.  Ethnic  decentralization 
sets  up  ethnically  homogenous  entities  by 
demarcating  municipalities  according  to  the 
settlement  of  ethnic  groups.  Territorial 
decentralization,  in  contrast,  draws  municipal 
borders  based  on  traditionally  and  socio-
economically defined territories in order to construct 
ethnically  heterogeneous  municipalities,  in  which 
ethnic minorities constitute an important percentage 
of the overall population9 of the municipality. 
ETHNIC  DECENTRALIZATION  
Ethnic  decentralization  is  the  dominant  model  of 
decentralization in post-conflict societies. It follows a 
group-building approach of power-sharing, allowing 
for  a  high  degree  of  ethnic  self-determination 
(Hannum 2004: 274).  Ethnic decentralization seeks 
to  represent  all  citizens  through their  ethnic  elites, 
the self-determination of ethnic communities and a 
very  limited  need  for  cooperation  between  ethnic 
groups  (Schneckener  2002:  334).  Through  the 
transfer  of  decision-making  to  ethnically  defined 
territorial  entities,  the  state  guarantees  that  the 
concerns of ethnic groups living in these territories 
will  be heard  and considered in political  decisions. 
Moreover it incentivizes cooperation with the central 
government  dominated by other  ethnic  groups  and 
establishes a channel for peaceful dialogue between 
elites  of  different  ethnic  groups  (Siegle/O’Mahony 
2006: 5).
However,  ethnic  decentralization  has  several 
disadvantages that perpetuate ethnic conflict: It con-
tributes to the homogenization of territories and thus 
hinders  the  return  of  refugees  and  internally 
displaced  persons  (Bieber  2002:  210).  Very  small 
ethnic communities that cannot constitute a majority 
even  at  the  local  level  will  be  excluded  from  this 
instrument  of  conflict  resolution  and  will  in 
9 In order for decentralization to promote the inclusion of 
minorities, a compact settlement of the minorities is 
indispensable. Not all ethnic minorities are concentrated in 
certain parts of the territory of states dominated by other ethnic 
groups. Settlement structures also influence the form of 
decentralization that can be implemented. If areas of settlement 
are strictly divided, territorial decentralization can hardly be 
achieved while ethnic decentralization requires this kind of 
settlement.
consequence also lack  an important  instrument  for 
the  representation  of  their  interests  at  the  central 
level  (Tranchant  2007:  12).  Furthermore,  ethnic 
decentralization might  create  new minorities  at the 
local  level  and contribute  to  a strong  imbalance  of 
power  due  to  the  perception  that  the  territory 
belongs to the new dominant ethnic group. Through 
competition  between  ethnically  defined  entities, 
ethnic  decentralization  might  paralyze  the  local 
political  system  and  transfer  ethnic  conflict  to  the 
regional level (Sambanis 2000: 480). 
Ethnic  decentralization  follows  the  top-down 
approach  of  conflict  resolution.  Ethnic  elites  are 
awarded  with  their  own power  bases  and,  in  turn, 
negotiate  the  interests  of  their  ethnic  group  at  the 
central level of government only. This favors political 
elites interested in securing their power base, which, 
instead of  creating incentives  for moderate politics, 
might  benefit  hardliners  ‘playing  the  ethnic  card’ 
(Siegle/O’Mahony  2006:  8).  It  is  questionable 
whether  ethnic  decentralization  contributes  to  the 
creation  of  the  necessary  conditions  for  conflict 
transformation in the long run. Overall, there are few 
signs suggesting that the policy has a positive impact 
on the reduction of the salience of ethnicity and the 
establishment  of  cross-cutting  cleavages  (Simonsen 
2005). 
TERRITORIAL  DECENTRALIZATION
The  second  model,  territorial  decentralization, 
follows  integrative  approaches  to  power-sharing. 
Territorial decentralization seeks to create incentives 
for  moderation  among  ethnic  elites  and  the  ‘de-
ethnicizing’  of  politics  in  the  long  run.  Territorial 
entities  are supposed to serve as sphere of  contact, 
cooperation  and  trust-building  between  individuals 
from  different  ethnic  groups  and contribute  to  the 
transformation of their interests and relations. At the 
local level, territorial decentralization is supposed to 
support  inter-ethnic  contact  and  joint  decision-
making  within  municipal  institutions.  By  making 
individuals  aware  of  the  heterogeneity  of  interests 
within their ethnic group, it intends to contribute to 
the  creation  of  cleavages  cross-cutting  ethnic 
affiliation (Horowitz 2008: 108). In the end political 
elites depend on a heterogeneous electorate and will 
have  to  address  other  ethnic  groups  in  order  to 
dominate the local political institutions.  By ‘playing 
the  ethnic  card,’  local  politicians  risk  blocking  the 
political  system  and  thus  investments  in 
infrastructure  and  services  which  would  certainly 
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affect  their  popularity  among  the  population. 
Thereby, this approach creates incentives to address 
issues  that  cut  across  ethnic  groups.  It  provides 
politicians with the opportunity to test policies in a 
multi-ethnic context at the local level without facing 
the  public  attention  of  hardliners  common  at  the 
central level. This allows for the possibility to adopt 
positive  experiences  in  other  municipalities  and  at 
the central level (Horowitz 2008: 107).
On the  other  hand,  territorial  decentralization  also 
faces a number of  potential  challenges:  Jean-Pierre 
Tranchant highlights the problem of the ethnic elite 
capturing  funds  which  might  further  marginalize 
ethnic minorities (Tranchant 2007: 3). Furthermore, 
territorial  decentralization  might  reinforce  ethnic 
conflict  triggered  by  decision-making  on  conflict-
prone issues such as power over land, property and 
resources on the local level (Schou/Haug 2005: 30). 
Another  aspect  is  the  feasibility  of  territorial 
decentralization. The model does not respond to the 
need  for  self-determination  among  ethnic  groups. 
Especially  in  a  post-conflict  context  one  cannot 
assume  that  contact  and  joint  decision-making 
amongst ethnic groups is possible right away.
Instead  of  satisfying  the  needs  of  political  elites 
through  conflict  management,  territorial 
decentralization  takes  bottom-up  approaches  to 
peace-building.  It  creates  an  institutional  setting 
favouring  any  kind  of  moderate,  cross-cutting 
initiative  through  an  institutional  setting  favoring 
moderate  actors.  Within  these  structures  claims  of 
every  local  population,  the  responsibility  for 
sustainable  peace  is  transferred  to  the  local 
population  (Horowitz  1985:  213).  Despite  its 
promising  benefits  for  conflict  transformation, 
territorial  decentralization  has  seldom  been 
implemented  in  post-conflict  societies.  Following 
Sven Gunnar Simonsen’s  notion of  the ‘assumption 
of intransigence,’ there is a widespread belief that the 
“nature and intensity of ethnic divisions are beyond 
transformation” (Simonsen 2005: 298) and that thus 
ethnic conflict should be dealt with by the territorial 
and political separation of ethnic groups. Given that 
ethnic decentralization is regarded as one of the most 
feasible policies to do so, theorists and practitioners 
might  be  discouraged  from  applying  territorial 
decentralization  as  a  means  of  conflict 
transformation.
3. CASE  STUDY:  THE  
DECENTRALIZATION  POLICY  OF  THE  
REPUBL IC  OF  KOSOVO  
This  working  paper  assesses  the  influence  of  the 
Kosovar  decentralization  policy  on  the 
transformation of the ethnic conflict in the Republic 
of  Kosovo.  The  influence  of  the  municipalities 
established  by  the  decentralization  policy  of  the 
Republic of Kosovo is assessed in two steps. In a first 
step,  the  study  assesses  the  extent  of  the 
transformation  of  the  ethnic  conflict  within  the 
institutional structures of the Kosovar municipalities. 
Based  on  the  theory  of  conflict  transformation 
through  decentralization,  five  indicators  are 
considered:  1)  the  inclusion  of  non-majority 
communities  in  municipal  structures,  2)  the 
cooperation  and  influence  of  non-majority 
communities  on  decisions;  3)  the  development  of 
shared goals;  4)  and 5)  the  salience of  ethnicity  in 
decision-making  and  the  freedom  of  action  of 
representatives in municipal institutions. In a second 
step, the transformation of the ethnic conflict within 
the society at the local level is evaluated. In order to 
do so,  four  indicators  deriving from the theory are 
assessed:  1)  the  cooperation  amongst  ethnic 
communities  and  the  integration  into  a  shared 
society,  2)  the  salience of  ethnic  affiliation in  daily 
life,  3)  the establishment  of  cross-cutting cleavages 
and 4) the role of local  ethnic elites in the conflict. 
The last part discusses whether decentralization can 
also  negatively  affect  transformation  of  the  ethnic 
conflict and contribute to polarization.
This section starts with providing a short overview of 
the  ethnic  conflict  in  Kosovo  and  the  Kosovar 
decentralization policy,  focusing on the framework, 
demarcations  of  Kosovo’s  municipalities  and  the 
implementation  of  the  program.  Analyzing  the 
demarcation  of  Kosovo’s  municipalities  it  will  be 
shown that the decentralization policy applied a mix 
of ethnic and territorial decentralization, establishing 
both ethnic homogeneous and ethnic heterogeneous 
municipalities.  The  two  cases  will  be  evaluated 
separately. 
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3.1 THE  ETHNIC  CONFLICT  IN  
KOSOVO  
Protracted  ethnic  conflict  has  a  long  and  violent 
history in the region of Kosovo. The two main ethnic 
communities,  the  Serbs  and  the  Albanians,  claim 
legitimacy  over  the  territory  of  the  Kosovo  and 
Metohija  basins  based on two sources:  history  and 
demography.  Both  Albanians10 and  Serbs  claim  to 
have  settled  in  the  region  before  the  other  group 
immigrated,  and identifying their  roots  in different 
ancient  cultures  that  had  their  territorial  base  in 
Kosovo  (Malcolm  1999).  But  not  only  Serbs  and 
Albanians settled in this region. Due to the fertility of 
its soil during the Ottoman Empire, Kosovo became 
home  to  many  different  ethnic  groups,  mainly 
divided  by  language  and  religion.  Ethnic  diversity 
became an important source of the conflicts during 
the  20th century  in  which  Kosovo  experienced 
displacements of Albanians and Serbs alike (Malcolm 
1999: 356; Kreidl 2006: 46). The struggle culminated 
in  the  Kosovo  War  which  started  with  an  armed 
uprising of  the Kosovo-Albanian Kosovo Liberation 
Army  (KLA)  against  the  national  police  of  the 
Republic of Serbia, evolving into a war between the 
Yugoslav  army11 on  one  side  and  KLA  as  well  as 
NATO on the other side. With the withdrawal of the 
Yugoslav  army  from  the  territory  of  Kosovo,  the 
International  Community  assumed  authority  over 
Kosovo  with  NATO´s  Kosovo  Force  (KFOR).  This 
allowed  for  restoring  security  and  the  United 
Nation’s Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to administer 
the region and engaging in state building. KFOR and 
UNMIK acted status neutral leaving the authority to 
decide  on  the  final  status  of  the  region  to 
negotiations between the Republic of Serbia, Kosovar 
political  authorities  and  the  International 
Community  (Braun 2008).
10 In this paper the terms Albanian, Serb and Turk refer to the 
ethnic group of inhabitants of Kosovo, not to the citizens of the 
respective states. The term Kosovo-Serbs or Kosovo-Albanians 
will only be used to distinguish between citizens of neighboring 
countries and Kosovars of the same ethnic affiliation.
11 At this time the Yugoslav Army already only consisted of 
Serb and Montenegrin troops.
Illustration 2
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While historical facts continue to be highly disputed 
among  the  ethnic  communities  of  Kosovo,  the 
present  demographic  domination  of  Albanians,  a 
trend  in  the  second  part  of  the  20th century 
reinforced through voluntary and forced emigration 
of  Kosovo-Serbs  following  the  withdrawal  of  the 
Yugoslav army from Kosovo (HRW 1999), can hardly 
be  contested.  Nine  ethnic  communities  have  been 
officially registered in Kosovo. Albanians account for 
92.4 percent12 of  the  total  population  of 
approximately  1.8  million  inhabitants  and settle  in 
most of the territory albeit only scarcely in the border 
region to Serbia in the north of Kosovo13. Their native 
language is  Albanian.  Serbs account for 3.9 percent 
of  the  population  settling  at  the  northern  border 
north  of  the  Ibër/Ibar  river  and in  enclaves across 
the territory but concentrated in the Gjilan/Gnjilane 
valley in the east of  the Kosovo basin.  Their  native 
language  is  Serbian.  Bosniaks,  speaking  Bosnian, 
account for 1.1 percent of the territory settling mostly 
in Prizren/Prizren and enclaves in the vicinity, in the 
municipality  of  Dragash/Dragaš  as  well  as  in  the 
region of Pejë/Peć. Turks account for 0.8 percent of 
12 This study uses the demographics established by the last 
survey of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Kosovo 
developed in cooperation with the United Nation’s Population 
Fund (SOK 2011). The results of surveys of different institutes 
on the ethnic demography of Kosovo differ significantly, 
especially with regard to the percentages of smaller minorities.
13 The geographic distribution of the ethnic groups in Kosovo is 
based on statistics of the European Center for Minority Issues 
Kosovo (ECMI 2011)
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the  population  settling  predominantly  in 
Prizren/Prizren  and  Mamusa/Mamushë/Mamuša. 
Their native language is Turkish. Gorani, who speak 
Gorani,  account  for  0.8 percent  of  the  population 
settling  mostly  in  Dragash/Dragaš.  Ashkali,  mostly 
speaking  Albanian,  account  for  0.8 percent  of  the 
population, Roma, mostly speaking Serbian, account 
for  0.3 percent  of  the  population,  and  Egyptians, 
mostly speaking Albanian, account for 0.1 percent of 
the population. The latter ethnic groups are scattered 
over  the  entire  territory  of  Kosovo.  Croats  and 
Montenegrins,  speaking Croatian and Montenegrin, 
have  not  been  counted  in  the  official  statistics  of 
2011. They constitute a small percentage of less than 
0.1 percent of the total population settling in very few 
enclaves  in  the  center  and  respectively  the  east  of 
Kosovo. Analyzing the structure of settlement of non-
majority14 communities  in  the  Kosovo,  it  can  be 
concluded  that,  besides  the  Serb  dominated  north, 
non-majority  communities  live  in  settlements 
scattered over most of the territory of Kosovo next to 
settlements  of  Albanians  or  other  non-majority 
communities. 
3.2 THE  DECENTRALIZATION  
POLICY  OF  THE  REPUBL IC
In  the  aftermath  of  the  Kosovo  war,  UNMIK 
identified  decentralization  as  a  tool  for  conflict 
management.  It  created  the  base  of  the  recent 
decentralization program by organizing the territory 
of  Kosovo  in  municipalities  to  coordinate 
humanitarian  assistance  and  the  development  of 
local  administrative  structures,  merging  several 
Okrugs (local district of the Republic of Serbia (inter 
alia  under  the  province  Kosovo)).  During  the 
negotiations on the future status of Kosovo between 
the Republic of Serbia, the international community 
and Kosovar authorities which started in 2006, the 
decentralization  policy  was  politicized  and 
constituted  one  of  the  most  important  discussion 
topics  (Gjoni  et  al.  2010: 297 ff.).  When it  became 
clear that the negotiations would not be successful, 
United  Nations  Special  Envoy  Martti  Ahtisaari 
reported to the United Nations Security Council the 
Comprehensive  Proposal  for  the  Kosovo  Status  
Settlement,  in  which  he  proposed  an  independent 
Republic of Kosovo (United Nations 2007: 1 f.). The 
cornerstone  of  this  proposal  was  a  far  reaching 
14 Following the Kosovar constitution, the paper will make use 
of the term ‘non-majority communities’ for ethnic groups being 
in a minority on the territory of the Republic of Kosovo.
decentralization  policy  designed  to  achieve 
acceptance  of  the  Kosovar  authorities15 and  the 
population of all ethnic communities,  to reduce the 
struggle  for  dominance  and  legitimacy  over  the 
territory  and  to  enable  peaceful  coexistence  of  all 
ethnic communities on its territory (Gjoni et al. 2010: 
306).
Following two years of unsuccessful negotiations, the 
Kosovar  parliament,  a  part  of  the  Albanian-
dominated  provisional  self-government  institutions 
in  Kosovo,  declared  the  independence  of  the 
Republic  of  Kosovo  on  17th February  2008. 
Subsequently  the  Republic  was  recognized  by  the 
U.S.  and  most  of  the  European  Union  member 
states16 while the Republic of Serbia condemned this 
unilateral step and continues to claim Kosovo as one 
of its provinces. On 15th June 2008, the constitution 
of the Republic, which had been ratified on 8th April, 
entered into force.  With regard to  decentralization, 
the  constitution  follows  the  proposal  of  Martti 
Ahtisaari  by  recognizing  decentralization  as  an 
important  instrument  in  order  to  reconcile  the 
territorial needs of Albanians, Serbs and other ethnic 
communities.  Passed  in  Feb/March  2008,  the 
fundamental  laws  for  the  implementation  of 
decentralization were among the first decisions taken 
by the Kosovar parliament. These documents, which 
outline  the  structure  and  competencies  of  the 
municipal  level,  include  the  Law  on  Local  Self 
Government  (LLSG),  the  Law  on  Administrative 
Municipal  Boundaries  (LAMB),  the  Law  on  Local 
Government Finances (LLGF) and the Law on Local 
Elections (LLE).
The decentralization policy introduces two levels of 
governance:  the  central  government  with  the 
administration  of  the  Republic,  the  Kosovar 
parliament  and  judiciary  as  well  as  the  level  of 
municipalities with the municipal assembly and the 
municipal  administration.  Despite  quota  for  non-
majority  communities  all  institutions  of  the central 
government  are  clearly  dominated  by the  Albanian 
majority.  The  municipalities  are  mostly  based  on 
those  local  entities  established  by  UNMIK  and 
consist  of  several  cities  and/or  villages.  The 
population  of  these  municipalities  ranges  from 
numbers as low as 5.000 inhabitants up to 200.000 
15 The term ‘Kosovar authorities’ refers to political authorities 
of institutions of the self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo, 
founded on 17. November 2008.
16 Spain, Greece, Romania, Cyprus and Hungary did not 
recognize the Republic of Kosovo until today.
PAGE  14
CCS  W O R K I N G  P A P E R S  NO.  16
inhabitants. In total, 25 competencies17 are assigned 
to  municipalities  while,  as  part  of  an  asymmetric 
decentralization design,  those municipalities  with  a 
Serb  majority  receive  up  to  four  additional 
competencies18. The municipality’s executive body is 
the  mayor  who  presides  over  the  municipal 
administration. In this role the mayor represents the 
municipality,  appoints  and  directs  the 
administration,  proposes  the  annual  budget, 
municipal  regulations  as  well  as  other  acts  that 
require approval from the municipal assembly (Art. 
58 LLSG). He is directly elected by the population of 
the  municipality  for  a  four  year  term.  In 
municipalities  where  at  least  10  percent  of  the 
citizens  belong  to  non-majority  communities,  the 
mayor  appoints  a  deputy  for  non-majority 
community affairs (Art. 61 LLSG). The municipality’s 
legislative  body  is  the  assembly,  elected  by  the 
municipal  population  for  a  four  year  term,  which 
may adopt  acts  and regulations  (Art.  12  LLSG).  In 
addition, its competencies include the approval of the 
municipal budget, investment plans as well as further 
financial matters (Art. 40 (2) LLSG). The work of the 
municipal assembly is supported by two committees: 
the  Committee  on  Policy  and  Finance  and  the 
Committee on Communities.  The latter  reviews the 
compliance of the municipalities regarding the rights 
of  communities,  proposes  actions  to  protect  non-
majority communities and to enforce their needs at 
the municipal level (Art. 53 (2) LLSG) and serves as a 
platform  for  the  settlement  of  disputes  between 
ethnic communities (Art.  55 LLSG). The committee 
usually includes members of the municipal assembly 
and community representatives, thus representing all 
communities  living in the municipality  (Art.  53  (2) 
LLSG). Due to the high number of competencies at 
the  municipal  level  the  Republic  of  Kosovo  can  be 
regarded as highly decentralized.
The local political structures created by the Kosovar 
decentralization  policy  compete  with  Serb  parallel 
structures.  These  structures  offer  public  services 
17 Municipal competencies include exclusive competencies such 
as the development of municipal infrastructure, public services, 
primary and secondary education, public health care, as well as 
delegated competencies such as civil and cadastral registries, 
registration of local business and social welfare.
18 Enhanced competencies are cultural affairs (all municipalities 
in which the Serb population is in a majority), the right to select 
the director of the local police station (all municipalities in which 
the Serb population is in a majority), secondary health care 
(Severena Mitrovica/Mitrovica e veriut, Graçanicë/Gračanica, 
Shtërpcë/Štrpce), and tertiary education (Severena 
Mitrovica/Mitrovica e veriut).
supported by the Republic of Serbia which does not 
recognize  Kosovo’s  independence.  In  the 
municipalities north of the Ibër/Ibar river19, the Serb 
parallel  structures  exert  political  authority  and 
prevent the establishment of the municipalities of the 
Republic. In territories south of the Ibër/Ibar river, 
these structures compete with the services provided 
by Kosovar municipalities (Tahiri 2010: 21 f.).  They 
offer  medical  services  and  primary  and  secondary 
education in Serbian and serve as representations of 
the  Republic  of  Serbia  in  Kosovo  (Interview  16, 
2011).  While  the  primary  and secondary  education 
offered by the parallel structures is used by Serbian 
speaking non-majority  groups,  the medical  services 
are  open  to  all  inhabitants  of  the  region  although 
they are mostly avoided by Albanians. Executive and 
legislative organs of the Serb parallel structures are 
directly elected by the Serb population living in the 
respective territory (Interview 12, 2011; Interview 13, 
2011). 
3.3 DEMARCATION  OF  THE  
MUNICIPAL ITIE S
Analyzing the demarcation of the borders of Kosovo’s 
municipalities,  it  becomes  clear  that  the 
municipalities  are  mainly  based  on  demarcations 
already  established  by  the  UNMIK  authority  and 
traditional local entities. The local level consists of 37 
municipalities,  of  which  28  have  an  Albanian 
majority, eight have a Serbian majority and one has a 
Turkish majority. Looking at the ethnic composition 
of  the  population,  twelve  municipalities  can  be 
regarded  as  heterogeneous20.  As  operational 
definition,  municipalities  will  be  regarded  as 
heterogeneous  if  they  have  at  least  10  percent  of 
population belonging to communities  not being the 
majority  in  this  municipality.  Thereby,  the  paper 
follows the constitution of Kosovo which arranges for 
special rights for non-majority communities in these 
cases.  In  a  few  cases,  the  decentralization  process 
shifted the former municipal boundaries established 
by UNMIK to create new municipalities, thus altering 
the  ethnic  composition  of  existing  ones. 
Consequently  five  new  municipalities  with  a  Serb 
majority  and  one  municipality  with  a  Turkish 
majority  were  created  and  the  composition  of  one 
19 Due to the fact that the decentralization policy of the 
Republic of Kosovo has not been implemented in this region, the 
north of Kosovo is not part of this analysis.
20 Statistics are based on estimations of the European Centre for 
Minority Issues Kosovo (ECMI 2011).
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municipality  was  altered  to  a  Serb  majority.  Some 
new  municipalities  were  established  using  former 
‘mother  municipalities’21 (with  a  non-Albanian 
majority),  in  order  to  raise  the  percentage  of 
Albanian  living  there.  As  a  result,  decentralization 
created two new homogenous municipalities  with a 
Serb  majority  and  one  homogenous  municipality 
with a Turkish majority, while two of the new Serb-
dominated  municipalities  can  be  regarded  as 
ethnically heterogeneous. The decentralization policy 
allows for the establishment of new municipalities for 
non-majority  communities,  when  at  least  5000 
people  settling  in  a  closed  territory  in  which  they 
constitute  a  majority  (Interview  4,  2011).  In  this 
context,  especially  the  Bosniak  community  claims, 
albeit  until  now  unsuccessful,  the  establishment  of 
Bosniak  municipalities,  identifying  two  potential 
homogenous  Bosniak  municipalities  and  one 
potential  municipality  that  would  be dominated  by 
Bosniaks and Gorani.
The design of the decentralization process reflects its 
origin as a solution for the international conflict on 
the  status  of  Kosovo.  It  is  obvious  that  the  aim of 
decentralization has been to establish municipalities 
with Serb majorities. To achieve this aim, municipal 
borders  have  been  altered  cutting  across  socio-
economically linked areas22 (Interview 14, 2011) and 
very  small  municipalities  have  been  established 
which, in the long run, are hard to sustain given the 
high costs of municipal structures and services.
Despite the intention of the international community 
to  establish  trust  and  cooperation  among  all 
communities  (Interview  9,  2011),  the  needs  of 
smaller non-majority communities are hardly taken 
into  account  in  the  process.  Smaller  non-majority 
communities  barely  influenced the drafting process 
of  the  decentralization  policy  (Interview  3,  2011; 
Interview  1,  2011;  Interview  2,  2011;  Interview  5, 
2011 and Interview 6, 2011). Moreover, the municipal 
design reveals different standards for Serbs and for 
other  non-majority  communities.  While  there  are 
currently no more territories in Kosovo where Serbs 
constitute a majority of 5.000 inhabitants, other non-
majority communities that fulfilled this criterion did 
not receive municipalities. Only the Turks in Kosovo 
have been able to secure a municipality in which they 
21 The term ‘mother-municipalities’ describes municipalities on 
the territory of which a new municipality has been founded.
22 One example for this practice is the Serb village 
Pasjak/Pasjak which has been incorporated into the municipality 
Novo Brdo/Novobërdë, where the social services are at a 
distance of 30 kilometers while it is located two kilometers away 
from the city of Gjilan/Gnjilane (Tahiri 2010: 23).
constitute  a  majority.  Many experts  argue  that  the 
outcome  of  the  negotiation  on  the  decentralization 
has been influenced by the fact that the other non-
majority groups did not dispose of patronage states 
promoting  their  interests  (Interview  3,  2011; 
Interview 5, 2011).
It can be concluded that, for the Serbs, the intention 
of the decentralization process follows the concept of 
ethnic  decentralization,  separating  the  different 
communities  and  establishing  self-determination 
through far-reaching competencies at the municipal 
level  (Interview  5,  2011).  However,  looking  at  the 
ethnic distribution in Kosovo, a significant number of 
Serbs  continue  to  live  in  municipalities  with  an 
Albanian  majority  or  municipalities  which  can  be 
regarded as heterogeneous.  Due to the structure of 
ethnic settlement in Kosovo, it has not been possible 
to  completely  separate  Serbs  and  Albanians  with 
territorial  arrangements.  In  the  case  of  other  non-
majority  communities,  the  decentralization  policy 
follows  the  model  of  territorial  decentralization:  a 
significant number of individuals belonging to non-
majority groups live in heterogeneous municipalities 
in which they enjoy a special  representation in the 
municipal  assembly  and the  administration  who  is 
supposed  to  represent  their  interests  at  the  local 
level. In total, Kosovo still has twelve heterogeneous 
municipalities.  Due to  the mix of  homogenous  and 
heterogeneous municipalities, Kosovo is a promising 
case  study  to  analyze  the  dynamics  within  the 
municipalities  of  highly  decentralized  post-conflict 
societies. 
3.4 IMPLEMENTATION  OF  THE  
KOSOVA R  DECENTRALI S ATION  
POLICY
Three  and  a  half  years  after  the  decentralization 
policy  of  the  Republic  of  Kosovo  was  initiated,  all 
bodies  of  the  Kosovar  municipalities  south  of  the 
Ibër/Ibar  river  have been established.  The relevant 
ministries  of  the  Kosovar  government  established 
structures  for  cooperation  and  financing  of  local 
institutions  (Interview  9,  2011;  Interview  3,  2011). 
While on paper the decentralization process in these 
regions has been concluded, in practice the Kosovar 
municipalities face several challenges prior to being 
fully functional.
Despite the cooperation between the central level and 
the  municipalities,  the  acceptance  of  the 
competencies of municipalities by some institutions 
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at  the  central  level  remains  a  challenge.  The 
government and the political elites of the Republic of 
Kosovo  continue  to  exert  control  over  local 
municipalities,  thereby  undermining  their 
competencies.  In  some  cases,  for  example, 
hierarchical  party  structures  hinder  autonomous 
decision-making at the local level (Interview 8, 2011). 
Furthermore,  some  competencies  related  to  social 
services  remain  on  the  central  level  since  the 
financial means required by the municipalities to be 
able  to  assume  their  responsibilities  fail  to  be 
transferred  (Interview  5,  2011).  Another  challenge 
consists  in  the  acceptance  of  newly  established 
municipalities  by  their  mother  municipalities. 
Conflicts arose especially over the transfer of income 
generating  competencies,  like  issuing  building 
licenses  (Tahiri  2010:  18  ff.)  or  the  transfer  of 
administrative  issues  such  as  civil  registers  (Gashi 
2010: 9).
On the positive side, there is no general disadvantage 
for  non-majority  municipalities  regarding  the 
financial  contribution  through  the  government  of 
Kosovo.  Furthermore,  political  representatives  of 
non-majority  communities  can  often  act  more 
autonomously given that their leadership faces fewer 
directives from party elites (Interview 3, 2011).
Equally  important  for  a  lack  of  functionality  of 
municipalities  is  the  lack  of  respect  for  democratic 
competencies,  especially  with  regard  to  the 
institutional  separation  of  power  within  the 
municipalities.  The  dominating  institution  on  the 
local  level  is  the  mayor,  serving  as  focal  point  for 
politicians and companies and often taking decisions 
that  lie  within  the  competencies  of  the  municipal 
assemblies  (Interview  2,  2011;  Interview  5,  2011). 
The  functionality  and  influence  of  the  municipal 
assemblies and the committee for communities differ 
from municipality to municipality. Yet in many cases, 
these bodies  only participate to a low extent in the 
decision-making  process  (Interview  8,  2011).  Two 
reasons  for  this  institutional  deficit  should  be 
highlighted: the delegates’ dependency on the income 
generating positions often assigned to them directly 
by the mayor and other elites of the administration 
(Interview  10,  2011)  and,  closely  related,  the 
hierarchical  party structures in which delegates  are 
not  held  accountable  by their  constituency and are 
often  dominated  by  superiors  (Hajnal/Péteri  2010: 
42 f.).
Another  challenge  for  the  functionality  of  Kosovar 
municipalities  are  the  staff’s  capabilities:  Most 
municipalities  are  affected  by  a  lack  of  individual 
capacities due to missing skills and training of local 
officials.  Serb-majority  municipalities  tend  to  be 
more  affected  than  other  municipalities  as  they 
compete  with  the  Serb  parallel  structures  for 
qualified  personnel.  Since  many  Serbs  reject  the 
Kosovo  structures  and  authorities,  it  is  difficult  to 
find  adequately  skilled  public  servants  wanting  to 
work  with  the  Kosovar  institutions  (Interview  12, 
2011;  Interview  16,  2011).  On  the  other  hand, 
municipalities  like  the  Serb-dominated 
Ranillug/Ranilug  illustrate  that  Kosovo  municipal 
institutions  can  generate  acceptance  and  support 
when they are able to provide efficient social services 
and  are  actively  shaping  municipal  policies 
(Interview 13, 2011).
These  challenges  reflect  top-down  decentralization 
processes  in  which  competencies  are  assigned  to 
municipalities that possess neither the capacities nor 
the  democratic  structures  to  carry  out  these  new 
responsibilities  efficiently  and  democratically 
(Interview  5,  2011).  However,  shifting  additional 
competencies to the local level when accompanied by 
the  consolidation  of  local  structures  can  empower 
municipalities in the long-term (Tahiri 2010: 37).
After three and a half years, the Kosovar population 
is  divided  in  its  acceptance  of  the  decentralization 
process.  Experts  state  that  most  Albanians  accept 
decentralization  as  a  concession  to  non-majority 
communities  for  the  independence  of  Kosovo 
(Interview  2,  2011;  Interview  6,  2011).   They  claim 
that despite being implemented in all municipalities, 
in  the  public  perception  decentralization  only 
benefits  Serbs.  This  perception  would  cause 
decentralization  to  be  seen  as  a  policy  aimed 
exclusively  at  the  inclusion  of  non-majority 
communities, not for the benefit of all municipalities 
in Kosovo.  Therefore,  some Albanians  would reject 
decentralization  because  they  think  it  primarily 
divides Kosovo ethnically (Tahiri 2010: 15; Interview 
6,  2011).  But  on  the  municipal  level  interviewed 
experts  note that  many Albanians  rejected the new 
Serb dominated municipalities at first, but after some 
time,  most  Albanians  who  presently  live  in  Serb-
dominated municipalities  started to  accept  the new 
municipality.  Crucial  for  this  shift  in  perception 
would be the benefits stemming from social services, 
jobs generated through municipal structures and the 
inclusion in decision-making on the municipal level 
(Interview 6, 2011; Interview, 10 2011; Interview 12, 
2011).
Serbs seem to be deeply divided in their acceptance 
of  the  municipalities  of  the  Republic  of  Kosovo. 
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Interviews  show  that  some  Serbs  reject  the  new 
municipalities because they perceive any cooperation 
with  the  local  Kosovar  structures  by  default  as  an 
acceptance  of  the  Republic  of  Kosovo.  But  the 
majority of Serbs living south of the Ibër/Ibar river 
discarded  such  categorical  rejections  of  Kosovar 
structures  (Interview  3,  2011;  Interview  5,  2011; 
Interview  10,  2011).  The  implementation  of  the 
decentralization  process  has  decreased  the  political 
domination of the Albanians in their municipalities, 
especially  since  decisions  on municipal  matters  are 
brought  closer  to  the  people,  job  opportunities  are 
created and daily life is affected (Interview 15, 2011; 
Interview  12,  2011).  An  issue  for  Serbs  was  the 
demarcation of municipal borders for the creation of 
the new municipalities. While the residents of some 
Serb  villages  complained  because they remained in 
Albanian-dominated  municipalities,  others  objected 
being  cut  off  from  the  social  services  provided  in 
their  Albanian  neighborhood  (Interview  2,  2011; 
Interview  14,  2011).  At  present,  there  are  Serb 
villages  that  fully  collaborate  with  the  Kosovar 
municipal structures next to Serb villages that either 
completely  or  partly  refuse  any  collaboration  with 
those structures. Smaller non-majority communities 
generally  do  not  reject  the  decentralization process 
and  try  to  benefit  more  from  it  by  promoting  the 
creation  of  new  municipalities  where  their  ethnic 
group will be in the majority (Interview 5, 2011). 
3.5 CONFLICT  TRANSFOR M ATION  
THROUGH  THE  DECENTRALIZATION  
POLICY
INTERETHNIC  COOPERATION  IN  
MUNICIPAL  STRUCTURE S
Municipal  structures can be a decisive platform for 
contact  between  representatives  of  ethnic 
communities  in  post  conflict  societies.  In  Kosovo, 
they are often the only platforms for such exchange 
(Interview 12, 2011). But the fact that municipalities 
have been established and are accepted by a majority 
of  the population of  Kosovo does not automatically 
imply  that  local  structures  contribute  to  a 
transformation of the ethnic conflict. As shown in the 
theory  section,  municipalities  may  contribute  to 
conflict  transformation  by  promoting  contact, 
cooperation  and  trust-building  between 
representatives  of ethnic groups and thus influence 
the  perception  of  individuals  of  other  ethnic 
affiliation  and  the  relations  between  individuals  of 
different  ethnic  groups.  In  this  section,  conflict 
transformation  within  the  municipal  structures  in 
Kosovo  is  assessed  based  on  five  indicators:  the 
inclusion of non-majority communities in municipal 
structures,  the  cooperation  and  influence  of  non-
majority  communities  on  political  decisions,  the 
salience  of  ethnicity  in  decision-making,  the 
development  of  shared  goals  and  the  freedom  of 
action  of  representatives  in  municipal  institutions. 
Findings  for  heterogeneous  municipalities  will  be 
evaluated  separately  from  homogeneous 
municipalities.
In  heterogeneous  municipalities,  the  Kosovar 
Ministry  for  Local  Governance  Assessment  claims 
that all non-majority communities are represented in 
the  municipal  assemblies  and  mostly  also  in  the 
municipal  administrations  (Interview  9,  2011).  In 
these  institutions,  regular  contact  between 
representatives of all ethnic groups is ensured. This 
assessment  is  confirmed  by  experts,  noting  a  high 
level  of  inclusion  of  non-majority  communities  in 
administrative and political processes, irrespective of 
whether  the  municipalities  are  composed  of  two 
ethnic communities, such as Štrpce/Shtërpcë,  Novo 
Brdo/Novëbërde or  Kllokot/Klokot,  or  of  one large 
Albanian community and rather small non-majority 
communities,  such  as  Prizren/Prizren  and 
Gjilan/Gnjilane  (Interview  2,  2011;  Interview  14, 
2011; Interview 1, 2011).
As part of the political decision-making processes in 
heterogeneous  municipalities,  non-majority 
communities  generally  cooperate  with  the  ethnic 
majority and are, to a varying extent, able to advance 
important  interests.  Among examples of  policies  in 
which  non-majority  groups  achieved  their  interests 
are  debates  about  the  distribution  of  funds  for 
infrastructure  projects  is  the  municipality  of 
Prizren/Prizren (Interview 14,  2011).  Debates  about 
policies  of  local  identity  such  as  the  municipal 
symbols of Prizren/Prizen and Kllokot/Klokot or the 
official  municipal  languages  of  Prizren/Prizren  and 
Gjilan/Gnjilane  (Interview  11,  2011;  Interview  8, 
2011;  Interview  2,  2011)  further  constitute  such 
examples.  Contrary  to  assumptions  regarding 
territorial decentralization, experts assume that only 
to a small extent can elite capture of public funds in 
the  municipalities  be  perceived  as  ethnically 
influenced.  Instead,  clan  or  family  affiliations  are 
often  more  important  for  the  misuse  (Interview  8, 
2011).
Despite  the  contact  and  cooperation  between 
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representatives of the ethnic communities within the 
structures  of  heterogeneous  municipalities,  ethnic 
affiliation seems to remain of major importance for 
decision-making.  It  still  tends  to  be  an  ethnicized 
bargain  between  the  communities  over  available 
funds  and  positions  of  influence.  This  salience  of 
ethnicity  in the political  process  is  reflected by the 
fact that interviewed experts were not able to identify 
any  multi-ethnic  parties  or  coalitions  on  the  local 
level.
Although being an exception, in some heterogeneous 
municipalities  a  common  vision  for  economic 
development has emerged, uniting representatives of 
all  ethnic  communities  in  these  municipalities 
thereby  decreasing  the  salience  of  ethnicity  in 
political  decision-making.  International  experts 
identify  the  municipality  of  Štrpce/Shtërpcë  where 
Serbs  and  Albanians  work  jointly  on  the  vision  of 
infrastructural  development  of  the  local  ski  resort 
with  the  aim  of  attracting  visitors  and  generating 
income  (Interview  1,  2011;  Interview  5,  2011;  ICG 
2009)  as  the  most  prominent  case.  Another,  albeit 
less  developed,  case  of  an  economic  project  that 
unites Albanian and Serb communities is the newly 
established  municipality  Kllokot/Klokot  (Interview 
12, 2011). In both municipalities, political debates do 
not only take the form of a trade-off between ethnic 
communities,  but  are  also  influenced  by individual 
interests  uniting  and  organizing  inhabitants  of  the 
municipality thus overcoming the dominant cleavage 
ethnicity.
Despite some progress on interethnic cooperation in 
heterogeneous  Kosovar  municipalities, 
representatives of the ethnic communities sometimes 
receive  guidance  and  face  pressure  from  elites  of 
their ethnic groups reducing their freedom of action. 
Especially in the process of the establishment of the 
Kosovar  municipalities  and  thus  reinforcing  the 
presence of the Kosovar state outside of the capital, 
local representatives of all ethnic groups received the 
attention  of  political  elites  from  Prishtina/Priștina 
and Belgrade as well as of political hardliners in their 
respective  municipality  (Interview  12,  2011; 
Interview  14,  2011).  Especially  Serbs  cooperating 
with  the  Kosovar  institutions  are  targeted  by 
hardliners,  so  are  some Serbs  working  in  the  Serb 
parallel structures trying to reduce the cooperation of 
Serbs with the Kosovar municipalities  (Interview 1, 
2011).  Experts  working  on  the  capacity-building  of 
municipalities registered exclusion and verbal threats 
against Serbs collaborating with Kosovar structures. 
However,  threats  rarely  take  the  form  of  violence 
against “collaborators” (Interview 14, 2011; Interview 
10,  2011).  On  the  positive  side,  the  influence  of 
radical  parties  of  the  Republic  of  Serbia  is  rather 
limited  south  of  the  Ibër/Ibar  river  (Interview  4, 
2011).
In the process  of  the  establishment  of  the  Kosovar 
municipalities, Albanians have also been targeted by 
hardliners  over  their  cooperation  with  the 
government  in  the  establishment  of  the  Serb-
majority  municipalities  of  Kllokott/Klokot  and 
Novёberde/Novo  Brdo.  In  these  cases,  experts 
registered intimidations, extortions and few cases of 
violent  acts  (Interview  12,  2011).  Furthermore,  in 
some municipalities party elites in Prishtina/Priștina 
interfere  in  political  decision-making  on  the 
municipal  level (Hajnal et al.  2010: 42 f.).  In some 
cases representatives of smaller ethnic communities, 
especially  of  Roma,  Ashkali  and  Egyptian  (RAE) 
communities  have  been  forced  to  choose  sides 
between the two conflicting communities (Interview 
3, 2011). While threats and the influence of political 
elites  have  seriously  interfered  with  the  process  of 
the  establishment  of  municipalities  in  2008  and 
2009,  experts  assume  that  it  does  not  decisively 
influence the interethnic cooperation in homogenous 
municipalities  anymore  (Interview  12,  2011, 
Interview 1, 2011).
While  in  heterogeneous  municipalities  ethnic 
communities  cooperate  in  the  municipal 
administrations  and  the  municipal  assemblies,  in 
homogeneous municipalities the small non-majority 
communities  are  often  not  represented  in  these 
institutions.  Therefore,  the  Committees  for 
Communities  provide  the  decisive  platform  for 
interethnic  contact  (Interview  8,  2011).  These 
committees do not  provide regular  contact  and are 
often exclusively attended by representatives of non-
majority  communities,  being  perceived  as  an 
institution  only  representing  the  interests  of  these 
communities (Interview 1, 2011). Experts working on 
the  capacity-building  of  the  Committees  for 
Communities  criticize  that,  due  to  the  limited 
influence of the Committees for Communities,  non-
majority  communities  are  rarely  included  in  the 
political  decision-making  process  in  the  municipal 
structures (Interview 12, 2011; Interview 14, 2011). In 
this  context,  non-majority  communities  remain 
marginalized,  being  hindered  to  develop  common 
interests and aims.
It  can  be  concluded  that  in  heterogeneous 
municipalities,  following  the  design  of  territorial 
decentralization,  two  indicators  of  conflict 
PAGE  19
LOE W:  DECE NTRAL IZAT ION  AS  A  MODE L  OF  CONF L ICT  TRANSFORMAT ION :  THE  CASE  OF  KOSOVO
transformation through decentralization are fulfilled: 
1)  the  municipal  assembly  and  the  municipal 
administration serve as a platform for the promotion 
of  constructive  interethnic  contact  while  2)  non-
majority  communities  cooperate  in  and  exert 
influence  on  the  decision-making  process  in  the 
municipal  structures.  Two  indicators  are  partly 
fulfilled:  5)  local  representatives  have  gained  a 
certain  degree  of  freedom  of  action  with  the 
consolidation of  the  municipal  structures,  although 
some  influence  especially  through  Serb  parallel 
structures  and  Albanian  party  elites  remain;  3) 
experts  reported  the  development  of  shared  goals 
and objectives on which all ethnic groups cooperate 
only in two municipalities. In this context, the fourth 
indicator  regarding  a  decrease  of  the  salience  of 
ethnicity  in  the  decision-making  process  in 
municipalities  is  not  fulfilled.  In  homogeneous 
municipalities  following  the  model  of  ethnic 
decentralization, on the contrary,  representatives of 
non-majority  communities  have  hardly  been 
included in the political process and no indicator of 
conflict transformation through decentralization has 
been met.
In  both  models  of  decentralization,  three  major 
preconditions  for  cooperative  interethnic 
cooperation  within  municipal  structures  can  be 
identified:  the  heterogeneous  composition  of  the 
municipality  and  thus  the  limited  dominance  of  a 
single ethnic  group;  the  extent to  which the ethnic 
community  is  organized  around  their  interests  in 
municipal affairs which is often also connected to the 
size of the community (Interview 12,  2011) and the 
extent to which the mayor of the municipality tries to 
assume  a  mediating  and  ethnically  impartial  role 
(Interview 12, 2011; Interview 8, 2011). 
CONFLICT  TRANSFOR M ATION  ON  
THE  LOCAL  LEVEL
For  the  establishment  of  peace  in  ethnic  conflicts 
political  elites  have  to  accept  a  certain  extent  of 
power  sharing  and  non-violent  decision-making 
procedures.  But  even  where  stable  arrangements 
between political elites have been achieved, peace can 
still  not  be  sustainable  if  ethnic  communities  have 
not been reconciled and do not discard violence as 
instrument to solve disputes between ethnic groups. 
As an approach towards enhanced peace building on 
the  local  level,  the  theory  section  of  this  paper 
outlined  bottom-up  peace  processes.  In  this 
approach, peace has to be built on the local level and 
is  believed  to  subsequently  spread  towards  the 
central  level  of  the  state.  It  is  based  on  the 
assumption  that  strongly  connected  ethnic 
communities  cannot  easily  be  used  by  ethnic 
entrepreneurs  as  an  instrument  for  ‘playing  the 
ethnic card’. In the case of Kosovo, municipalities are 
the  institutions  directly  influencing  the  local  level 
and are thus in the position to contribute to bottom-
up  peace  processes,  mainly  through  the 
establishment  of  cooperation  and  conflict 
transformation within the municipal structures. This 
paper  assesses  the  transformation  of  the  ethnic 
conflict  in  Kosovo  on  the  local  level  using  four 
indicators:  the  cooperation  amongst  ethnic 
communities  and  the  integration  into  a  shared 
society,  the  reduction  of  the  salience  of  ethnic 
affiliation  in  daily  life,  the  establishment  of  cross-
cutting  cleavages  and  a  moderating  role  of  local 
representatives in the conflict.
During  the  last  three-and-a-half  years,  the 
integration of the ethnic communities settling south 
of the Ibër/Ibar river into Kosovar society seems to 
have improved. Experts observe that the Bosniak and 
the Turk communities  are starting to integrate into 
one  Kosovar  society  even  if  dominated  by  the 
Albanian community. But contact between Albanians 
and Serbs, coming to a hold during violent conflict, 
also  seems  to  have  been  revived,  especially  due  to 
mutual  benefits  resulting  from  economic  exchange 
(Interview 3, 2011; Interview 14, 2011). International 
experts  supporting  the  decentralization  process 
argue  that  links  between  individuals  of  different 
ethnic  affiliation  start  to  exceed  mere  business 
contacts,  albeit  only  to  a  low  extent  and  only  in 
heterogeneous  municipalities  (Interview  11,  2011; 
Interview 2, 2011).
Experts  think  that  the  structures  of  heterogeneous 
municipalities  of  the  Republic  have  contributed  to 
this trend through the establishment of contact and 
cooperation  between  members  of  all  ethnic 
communities, including the Serbian population. This 
is  supported  by  the  observation  that  cooperation 
between  individuals  of  different  ethnic  groups 
develops  mostly  on  the  local  level  and  within  the 
borders  of  shared  municipalities.  According  to 
experts,  officials  in  municipal  administrations  have 
been able to diminish the influence of Serb parallel 
structures  and to  reach  out  to  the Serb  population 
(Interview 1,  2011;  Interview 3,  2011;  Interview 12, 
2011).  Other  non-majority  groups  embrace 
decentralization  more  actively  as  an  important 
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element for the integration in Kosovo, requesting the 
establishment  of  further  municipalities  with  a 
majority of their own ethnic community. Because the 
most  important  requirement  for  interethnic 
cooperation  are  long  lasting  relationships  built  on 
mutual trust,  experts regard the cooperation within 
municipalities as promising for the establishment of 
lasting  interethnic  links  (Interview  3,  2011).  In 
contrast,  cooperation exceeding the local  context  is 
often  prevented  by  mistrust  of  unacquainted 
individuals  from  other  ethnic  groups  (Interview  2, 
2011).  Therefore,  contact  established  in 
heterogeneous municipalities seems not to spread to 
homogeneous  municipalities  and  observers  report 
that  yet  only  very  few interethnic  contacts  exist  in 
heterogeneous  municipalities  (Interview  8,  2011; 
Interview 12, 2011).
The limited progress in the integration of ethnic non-
majority groups hardly seems to have translated into 
a reduction of the salience of ethnicity in the daily life 
of Kosovars. The decentralization policy has not yet 
been  able  to  significantly  influence  the  fact  that 
ethnicity  remains  the  most  important  aspect  in 
interpersonal relations. The continuing high salience 
of  ethnicity  is  demonstrated  by the mobilization  of 
the  Kosovar  population  by  issues  of  relevance  for 
ethnic  identity.  Many  conflicts  on  the  local  level 
evolve  along  policies  on  languages  and  municipal 
symbols (Interview 11,  2011).  Furthermore,  political 
entrepreneurs  still  seem to be  able  to  further  their 
individual  interests  by  employing  the  strategy  of 
ethnicizing contentious issues. For example, the fact 
that  the  Serb-Orthodox  church  may  veto 
construction  projects  in  the  historic  center  of 
Prizren/Prizren  has  been  used  by  Albanian 
constructors to raise protests against a construction 
ban  in  this  area  of  the  city  (Interview  14,  2011). 
Another indicator for the salience of ethnicity is the 
decline  in  the  perception  of  security  among  Serbs 
living south of the Ibër/Ibar river since the escalation 
of the ethnic conflict in the north (Interview 15, 2011; 
Interview 13, 2011).
The political landscape and civil society also remain 
largely  separated.  Registered  parties  or  coalitions 
including  representatives  of  different  ethnic 
communities exist neither on the national nor on the 
local level. Hence, according to observers, in national 
as well as municipal elections, communities vote for 
the  representatives  of  their  ethnic  communities 
(Interview 11, 2011). Regarding civil society, experts 
could  only  name  few  multiethnic  NGOs  or 
cooperation  that  go  beyond  commercial  relations 
(Interview 15, 2011; Interview 14, 2011). Often NGOs 
of  different  groups  exist  side  by  side  without  any 
form  of  cooperation  although  they  pursue  similar 
goals  (Interview 12,  2011;  Interview 13,  2011).  Still, 
some  experts  remarked  positively  that  the,  albeit 
limited, number of examples of cooperation indicate 
a  frail  decrease  of  the  antagonism  between  ethnic 
communities.  One  of  such  cases  is  the  growing 
interest  in  Albanian  and  Serbian  language  courses 
among  politicians  and  citizens  in  multiethnic 
municipalities, which was noticed by the OSCE and 
NGOs (Interview 3, 2011; Interview 1, 2011).
The  limited  progress  towards  a  multiethnic  civil 
society cannot be explained by the messages sent out 
by  the  local  political  elites  such  as  mayors  and 
deputies.  According  to  experts,  local  elites  and 
representatives  mostly  advocate  moderate  position 
and often serve as moderators in case of controversy, 
facilitating  interethnic  contact  and  cooperation 
(Interview  3,  2011;  Interview  12,  2011).  Striking 
examples for local representatives who embrace such 
a role as interethnic facilitators are the mayors of the 
heterogeneous municipalities with a Serb majority in 
the east of Kosovo. Another prominent example for 
the  conciliatory  character  of  the  local  political 
messages is the disapproval of the use of violence by 
their  Serb  representatives  south  of  the  Ibër/Ibar 
river during the escalation of the conflict in the north 
of  Kosovo  in  August  2011  (Interview  11,  2011; 
Interview 8, 2011). Following the theory of bottom-
up peace processes, experts assess that the moderate 
stance  of  non-majority  representatives  from  the 
municipalities influences interethnic cooperation on 
the central  level.  Important positions in the central 
government  are  held  by  representatives  of  non-
majority  communities  with  pertinent  experience  in 
moderating  interethnic  controversies  on  the  local 
level (Interview 3, 2011; Interview 1, 2011).
It  can be concluded that  1)  the  administrative  and 
legislative structures of heterogeneous municipalities 
have  supported  a  small  improvement  in  the 
cooperation  among  ethnic  communities  and  the 
integration into a shared society, which does not yet 
exceed cooperation within the municipal  structures 
and economic exchange. Until now, the improvement 
concerning cooperation and integration has not led 
to 2) a reduction of salience of ethnicity in daily life 
and 3) the establishment of cross-cutting cleavages. 
Nevertheless,  heterogeneous  municipalities  have 
contributed to the 4) advancement of representatives 
of  ethnic  groups  holding  positions  on  the  national 
level  and advocating  moderate  stances  towards  the 
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ethnic  conflict.  Thus  two  indicators  for  conflict 
transformation on the local level, 2) the reduction of 
the salience of ethnic affiliation in daily life and the 
3) establishment of cross-cutting cleavages have not 
been  fulfilled,  while  1)  the  integration  and 
cooperation  amongst  communities  and  the  4) 
moderating  role  of  local  representatives  in  the 
conflict can be regarded as partly fulfilled.
POLARIZATION  OF  ETHNIC  
CONFLICT  THROUGH  
DECENTRALIZATION
The  Kosovar  decentralization  policy  does  not  only 
contribute  to  conflict  transformation,  it  also  bears 
the risk of creating a source for ethnic polarization 
and  conflict.  Three  sources  for  ethnic  polarization 
should  be  highlighted:  the  perception  of 
decentralization,  the  demographic  trend  and  the 
financing of the municipalities.
The first source is the perception of some Albanians 
that  the  decentralization policy  divides  the country 
into  territories  belonging  to  ethnic  groups.  In  this 
context,  some  local  conflicts  evolved  along  special 
rights of the Serb community. Not being part of the 
decentralization  policy  but  connected  to  this 
discussion  is  a  dispute  about  Serbian  Special 
Protected Zones in which the Serb community may 
veto  construction  of  homes and other  buildings  by 
Albanians (Interview 11, 2011). A creation of further 
municipalities for Bosniaks and Gorani might deepen 
the  Albanian  perception  of  the  decentralization 
policy as a policy for the division of the Republic and 
thus  my  contribute  to  a  polarization  in  the  ethnic 
conflict .
Another  source  for  ethnic  polarization on the local 
level are controversies over issues of high relevance 
for  ethnic  identity  connected  with  the  ethnic 
composition  of  municipalities.  The  demographic 
trend might  pose new sources  of  conflict.  Through 
the  emigration  of  young  Serbs  and  the  return  of 
Albanians, the demographic composition of the Serb 
dominated municipalities might shift. It is uncertain 
how the Serbian population would react to this trend 
should  they  become  a  minority  in  the  few 
municipalities they currently dominate. One example 
of identity policy anticipating the demographic shift 
is  the  alleged  attempt  of  assimilation  of  Gorani  by 
Bosniaks in Dragash/Dragaš through language policy 
in schools.  The education  policy  of  the  dominating 
Bosniaks leaves the Gorani with the impression that 
Bosniaks  attempt  to  dissolve  their  identity  by 
teaching  them  the  Bosnian  language  and  Bosniak 
identity.  It  is  assumed  that  through  this  policy 
Bosniaks are trying to raise the Bosniak share of the 
local population to above 50 percent, thus increasing 
their leverage in local politics (Interview 13, 2011).
A  third  source  for  conflict  is  the  financing  of  the 
municipalities.  Until  now,  the  new  and  small 
municipalities  with  a  Serb  majority  are  mostly  co-
financed  by  donors  such  as  governmental  agencies 
and private funds often investing in infrastructure or 
capacity-building in these municipalities. Due to low 
income  and  the  limited  budget  of  the  Republic  of 
Kosovo, it  is not clear whether these municipalities 
would be able to finance their services without such 
external funding. The need for cooperation with their 
neighboring municipalities or even the reintegration 
into  mother-municipalities  will  probably  create 
conflicts  (Interview  14,  2011).  This  problem  might 
even be aggravated through a cut of funding of the 
Serb  parallel  structures  through  the  Republic  of 
Serbia. The Kosovar municipalities will not be able to 
adequately  replace  primary  and  secondary  health 
service  and  education.  A  decline  of  local  services 
might  constitute  an  important  backlash  for  the 
integration  of  the  Serbs  and  other  ethnic 
communities  that  currently  benefit  from  these 
structures in the Republic of Kosovo. 
4. CONCLU S ION  
This  paper  analyzed  to  what  extent  the 
decentralization  process  of  the  Republic  of  Kosovo 
has  been  and  will  be  able  to  contribute  to  the 
transformation of the ethnic conflict.  It employed a 
theory of conflict transformation highlighting contact 
and  cooperation  as  a  source  for  pluralistic  social 
identities  and  cross-cutting  cleavages. 
Decentralization  has  been analyzed  on the basis  of 
two  models  which  use  different  mechanisms  for 
conflict  management:  ethnic  decentralization  and 
territorial decentralization.
The findings  point  towards  the conclusion that  the 
ethnic  conflict  in  Kosovo  is  still  far  from  being 
transformed.  Although  experts  notice  an 
improvement  in  the  cooperation  and  integration 
among  the  ethnic  communities  on  the  local  level, 
everyday life between the different ethnic individuals 
is still highly separated and ethnicity remains being 
the  most  important  social  group.  Moreover,  cross-
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cutting  cleavages  remain  undeveloped  as  political 
parties remain ethnicized and civil society is strictly 
organized along the lines of ethnic affiliation.
But in heterogeneous municipalities decentralization 
has been able to contribute to an institutional setting 
potentially providing for future transformation of the 
ethnic  conflict.  New  municipalities  have  been 
established  and  a  regular  exchange  between 
representatives  of  ethnic  communities  has  been 
established in these municipalities.  Benefiting from 
services  provided  by  the  municipal  structures,  the 
majorities  of  the  populations  of  all  communities 
seem  to  accept  Kosovar  structures.  Municipal 
elections  mostly  empowered  moderate 
representatives from all ethnic communities thereby 
contributing  to  the  establishment  of  contact  and 
cooperation  while  acting  moderately  in  ethnic 
disputes  in  their  respective  municipalities. 
Furthermore,  heterogeneous  municipalities  have 
contributed  to  the  formation  of  representatives  of 
non-majority  groups  holding  positions  on  the 
national  level  and  advocating  moderate  stances 
towards political debates/issues. Still, only in a  few 
cases  experts  reported  the  development  of  shared 
goals  and  cross-cutting  cleavages  within  the 
municipal institutions, thus the salience of ethnicity 
remains  high.  Furthermore,  representatives  on  the 
local  level  are  still  influenced  by  political  elites  of 
parallel  or  party  structures,  limiting  the  space  for 
interethnic  cooperation.  To  summarize,  newly 
established  cooperation  between  ethnic  groups 
within and outside of municipal institutions has not 
yet  translated  into  a  reduction  of  the  salience  of 
ethnicity  and  the  development  of  civil  society 
organized  around  cross-cutting  cleavages.  Still,  the 
developments in heterogeneous municipalities might 
contribute  to  a  long-term  transformation  of  the 
ethnic conflict in these municipalities.
In  contrast,  decentralization  had  less  impact  on 
conflict  transformation  in  homogeneous 
municipalities.  The  study  showed  that  in  these 
municipalities  non-majority  groups  are  not 
integrated  into  the  political  process  and  remain 
marginalized.  Both  models  of  decentralization have 
not  been  able  to  address  the  situation  of  the  RAE 
communities  in  Kosovo.  Mechanisms  for  political 
participation  and  political  competencies  on  local 
level have failed to prove to be adequate instruments 
for  the  inclusion  of  economical  and  societal 
marginalized communities which have a low level of 
self-organization  and  are  scattered  over  the  whole 
territory of the state.
Analyzing the potential for polarization of the ethnic 
conflict  through  decentralization,  it  becomes  clear 
that a transformation of the ethnic conflict is of high 
importance.  Only  through  diminishing  the 
competition  over  group  value  and  dominance 
between ethnic groups, can Kosovar society mitigate 
the potential  for  conflict  arising  from demographic 
trends and a potential integration of the Serb parallel 
structures into the Kosovar municipalities.
The  case  of  Kosovo  allows  for  some  conclusions 
regarding  decentralization  as  an  instrument  to 
promote  conflict  transformation  in ethnic  conflicts. 
The  Kosovar  decentralization  policy  shows  that 
municipalities  following  the  model  of  territorial 
decentralization can promote interethnic cooperation 
and establish benefits for moderation among ethnical 
elites.  Contrary  to  the  critique  of  territorial 
decentralization,  competencies  regarding  conflict 
sensitive  issues  as  territory  or  resources  do  not 
automatically lead to polarization and conflict on the 
local  level.  On  the  other  hand,  conflict 
transformation is a long process and decentralization 
can  only  be  one  instrument  contributing  to  this 
process. The findings of this study do not allow for a 
final  conclusion with regard to  the extent to which 
local  cooperation  between  ethnic  groups  can 
contribute  to  the  development  of  cross-cutting 
cleavages  and  the  reduction  of  the  salience  of 
ethnicity. This might be due to the short period for 
which the Kosovar decentralization policy has been 
in  place  but  also  indicates  that  cooperation  within 
administrative  institutions  is  not  sufficient  for 
producing  the  desired  effects.  It  can  be  concluded 
that  by  itself  decentralization  is  not  sufficient  to 
transform  an  ethnic  conflict  and  has  to  be 
complemented  with  policies  promoting  the 
establishment  of  local  civil  society  that  transcends 
ethnic borders and generates cross-cutting cleavages.
With  regard  to  ethnic  decentralization  the  study 
showed that this approach may contribute to the self-
determination of ethnic communities, but can hardly 
contribute to interethnic contact and cooperation as 
well as further reaching integration in deeply divided 
societies.  Moreover,  the  example  of  the  Kosovar 
decentralization  confirms  that  ethnic 
decentralization  further  marginalizes  small  non-
majority groups in homogeneous municipalities.
Looking  at  the  four  northern  provinces  of  Kosovo 
which should now be integrated into the structures of 
the Republic  of  Kosovo,  it  has to be remarked that 
these  municipalities  are  mainly  inhabited  by Serbs 
with  only  very  small  numbers  of  Albanians,  Roma 
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and Bosniaks. In this context it seems hardly possible 
to  recommend  the  implementation  of  a  territorial 
model.  Nevertheless,  the  population  center  of  the 
region,  the  city  of  Mitrovicë/Mitrovica,  has  always 
been a multiethnic city. Its division into an ethnically 
segregated city into a Serb dominated north and an 
Albanian dominated south occurred in the context of 
the  war  1998/99  and  is  now  cemented  by  the 
introduction  of  a  municipality  covering  only  the 
northern part of the city. On basis of the conclusion 
of this study it can be recommended not to generally 
rule out possible links between the two parts of the 
city  to  enable  the  long-term  transformation  of  the 
ethnic conflict in Mitrovicë/Mitrovica.
It should not remain unstated that some intervening 
variables could not be isolated. Especially the lower 
intensity  of  violence  during  the  Kosovo  war  in  the 
east and the south of the region might contribute to a 
higher  level  of  trust  and  contact  between  ethnic 
groups in these regions. Regarding the application of 
the Kosovo example to other cases, it also has to be 
stressed  that  the  settlement  structure  of  ethnic 
groups  in  Kosovo  allowed  for  the  creation  of 
heterogeneous  municipalities.  Furthermore,  it  is 
unclear  to  what  extent  the  model  of  territorial 
decentralization  can  be  implemented  in  deeply 
divided  societies  in  the  direct  aftermath  of  violent 
conflict.  These special factors of the case of Kosovo 
should encourage further research on other cases of 
territorial  models  of  decentralization  and  its 
influence  on  conflict  transformation.  By  gathering 
more  information  on  the  contribution  of 
heterogeneous  municipalities  on  conflict 
transformation, territorial decentralization might be 
promoted  as  an  alternative  to  concepts  of  ethnic 
decentralization in post conflict societies. 
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